

Major Power Competition and Troop Placement in Minor Powers

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Motivation

- Extensive literature on power projection of major powers
- Key tool of major power influence is troop deployments abroad
 - Very little research on the determinants of where major powers place their troops abroad.

Research Question

- What determines foreign troop placement by major powers?
 - Do they look to further develop their own sphere of influence?
 - Do they react to actions and characteristics of rival major powers?

Kennan and Containment

- George Kennan, Director of Policy Planning (State Department)
- “Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*
 - “main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies (861).”
 - The proposed policy was the “adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy (862).”

Spheres of Influence

- Major powers might seek to develop ideologically coherent spheres of influence.
 - They may be likely to cluster deployments in ideologically similar states, within regions.
 - increases credibility of major power commitment

Hypothesis 1: Major powers are more likely to deploy troops to a protégé if they have deployed troops to other ideologically similar states within the region.

Competing for Influence

- Major powers are strategic actors
- Might place troops in reaction to rival major power deployments
- Offset rival sphere of influence
 - U.S.-Australia Deployment 2012
 - reaction to China in South China Sea

Hypothesis 2: Major powers are more likely to deploy troops to a protégé if a rival major power has recently deployed troops to its protégés in that region.

Matching Strategies


- Also possible that major powers match strategies
- Locate troops in more distant locations when adversary locates in more distant locations
 - 1961 U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey
 - Soviet troops and missiles in Cuba

Hypothesis 3: Major powers are more likely to deploy troops to more geographically distant minor powers as rival major powers deploy troops to more distant minor powers.

Research Design: Model


- Model: Local Structure Graph Model
 - A network of edges (or dyads)
 - Edge forms when a major power deploys troops to a minor power
 - The estimator treats the formation of a specific edge as a function of the formation of other edges within a neighborhood.
 - Define neighborhoods in the network in terms ideological distance and geographic region

Network of Nodes



Network of Edges

Figure 3: Ideological Distance among Troop Deployments, 1985



Research Design: Dependent Variable

- Unit of analysis: dyad-year between a major and minor power
- Sample: All major-minor power pairs between 1981 and 2007.
 - we code permanent U.N. Security Council members as major powers
- Dependent Variable: The realization of an edge
 - the initial deployment or increases in deployments
 - operationalized using data from Brathwaite (2015)

Table 1: Total Troop Placements Abroad
 in Country-Years, 1981-2007.

U.S.	600
U.S.S.R.	361
France	223
U.K.	202
Italy	76
East Germany	68
Netherlands	66
Singapore	62
Australia	62
Cuba	61

Research Design: Independent Variables

- Ideology by Region Spatial Lag (hypothesis 1)
 - the ideological proximity between edges within a geographic region
 - Euclidian distance between a pair of nodes
 - larger values indicate greater ideological dissimilarity between edges
 - ideology identified by U.N. Voting (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2005)
 - negative coefficient: likelihood of deployment increases when there are other ideologically similar deployments in a minor power's region

Research Design: Independent Variables

- Temporal Lag (hypothesis 2)
 - a temporal lag of spatial measure
 - test whether troop deployments increase in response to number of deployments in previous year
 - positive coefficient: likelihood of troop deployments increases in response to deployments on opposite side of ideological spectrum

Research Design: Independent Variables

- Rival Geographic Distance Spatial Lag (hypothesis 3)
 - major power response to geographic location of deployments by rival
 - larger values indicate greater geographic distance between edges
 - positive coefficient: Likelihood of troop deployments (edges) increases when rival major power deploys troops in more distant locations

Results

Table 3: LSGM Estimates of Troop Deployments, 1981–2007.

	β	SE	β	SE
Ideology by Region Spatial Lag	-6.557	3.389		
Rival Geographical Distance Spatial Lag			7.329	1.888
Temporal Lag	8.331	0.344	0.011	0.245
Economic Growth	-0.243	0.495	-0.034	0.279
Rival Major Power Changes in Power	0.015	0.020	-0.198	0.036
Minor Power Capabilities	0.226	0.112	-0.289	0.153
Minor Power in International War	0.455	0.145	-0.246	0.104
Alliance	1.649	0.170	0.181	0.357
Trade	0.275	0.063	-0.039	0.384
Constant	-4.783	0.074	-2.094	0.820
Log-likelihood	-1524.648		-3814.336	
Observations	18119		18119	

Notes: 166 minor powers, 830 unique edges. Standard errors estimated from 100 bootstraps drawn from a Metropolis-Hasting algorithm after 50 burnin simulations and thinning every 5 iterations.

Conclusion

- States use deployments to build ideologically coherent spheres of influence.
- Major powers respond to previous rival deployments in a region by consolidating sphere of influence with additional troop deployments.
- States match rivals in terms of geographic distance of force projection.
- Major powers engage in competition, but follow norms of prudence in their interactions.
- Future work:
 - Russia and US?
 - China and US?
 - Minor power choices